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NOTES
CRIMINAL CONTEMPT AND TRIAL BY JURY
INTRODUCTION
The judicial power to punish for contempt has been well recognized
as the principle method of vindicating the authority of the courts and
assuring performance of their judgments and decrees. Extending from
early days in the history of England,' the doctrine was immersed in
the common law and adopted by the American colonies. At the time
of the transplantation of the common law and ratification of the Con-
stitution, the rights and procedures inherent in the common law con-
tempt power were also assimilated including summary proceedings.
This summary treatment, as opposed to trial by jury, has been a
classic problem in the administration of contempt, arising as the result
of the conflict of two basic American precepts; 1) the right of the
individual against unlimited governmental power, and 2) the necessity
of maintaining order and respect for our courts to insure their proper
functioning. The situation becomes more perplexing when an exam-
ination of the Constitution reveals neither provisions for the creation
or exercise of the contempt power nor limitations upon it.
Categorizations of the contempt power, which is essential in deter-
mining the procedural rights available to the contemnor,2 are basically
found in two uniformly accepted dichotomies;- the civil-criminal divi-
sion and the direct-indirect distinction. The line of demarcation in
the former is at best hazy since the same conduct may give rise to
either. In the leading case of Compers v. Bucks Stove and Range Co.,4
1. The power of the courts to act against disregard of their authority has been
firmly established in Anglo-Saxon jurisprudence, having developed from the concept of
contempt of the King's authority. See 17 F. R. D. 167 (1955). Originally, it was em-
ployed as a means of vindicating the courts' position by punishing through fine or
imprisonment. While the act was contemptuous of the court, it might also impair
the rights of an adverse party. Thus developed the concept of using the contempt
power to assist the adverse party in his remedy by conditional fine or imprisonment
or by fines paid in whole or in part to the opposing party and thereby giving rise to
the civil aspect of contempt.
2. Goldfarb, The Varieties of the Contempt Power, 13 SYRAcusE L. REv. 44 at 59
(1961).
3. GOLDFARB, THE CONTEMPT POWER 47 (1963).
4. 221 U.S. 418, 441 (1911). While this punishment and purpose indicia is most per-
suasive it is not always determinative. Cf. Wakefield v. Housel, 228 Fed. 712 (8th Cir.
1923) (employed the title of the proceedings); Lamb v. Cramer, 285 U.S. 217 (1932) (the
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the Supreme Court of the United States stated that the distinction be-
tween the two types could be found in the dominant character and
purpose of the proceeding. That is, where the primary purpose is to
preserve the court's authority and to punish for disobedience of its
orders, the contempt is criminal, but where this purpose is to provide
a remedy for an injury and to coerce compliance with an order, the
contempt is civil.
Criminal contempt is punitive in nature as a method of vindicating
the dignity and authority of the court and to protect the interests of
the general public.5 Due to its disciplinary character, penalizing past
acts or a failure to act, punishment by fine or imprisonment is absolute
and unconditional.6 The sanctions imposed in civil contempt differ
because of the divergence of objectives. Civil contempt is essentially
remedial, usually directed at compelling the defendant to act for the
benefit of the complainant, and the ordinary mode is by coercive fine
or imprisonment which is remitted upon compliance.7
The other classification regularly applied to contempts is the direct
and indirect distinction. The disparity is generally "based upon the
immediacy and location of the contemptuous act." s Direct contempts
consist of acts or words spoken in the presence of the court which
tend to physically obstruct, subvert, or prevent the proper administra-
tion of justice. Indirect, being the antithesis of direct, contempts are
nature of the relief sought); Mitchell v. Dexter, 244 Fed. 926 (1st Cir. 1917) (fact that
the contemnor had not testified); In re Kahn, 204 Fed. 581 (2d Cir. 1913) (person con-
ducting the prosecution); Eastern Concrete Steel Co. v. Bricklayers' and Mason Plasters'
International Union, 200 App. Div. 714, 193 N.Y. Supp. 368 (1922) (the party to whom
the fine is paid).
5. United States v. United Mine Workers, 330 U.S. 258, 302-03 (1947); In re Nevitt,
117 Fed. 448, 458 (8th Cir. 1902).
6. Parker v. United States, 153 F.2d 66, 70 (1st Cir. 1946); State ex rel Trezevant v.
McLeod, 126 Fla. 229, 170 So. 735 (1936); Ex parte Kottwitz, 117 Tex. 583, 8 S.W.2d
508 (1928).
7. In re Nevitt, supra note 5 at 461; Cf. United States v. United Mine Workers, supra
note 5 at 303-04"; Thompson v. Pennsylvania Railroad, 48 N.J.Eq. 105, 21 Ad. 182 (1891).
8. Goldfarb, supra note 3 at 68.
9. Clark v. United States, 289 U.S. 1 (1932); Melton v. Commonwealth, 160 Ky. 642,
170 S.W. 37 (1914); Blodgett v. Superior Cr., 210 Cal. 1, 290 Pac. 293 (1930). For
examples of acts constituting direct contempts see Ingles v. McMillan, 5 Okla. Crim. 130,
113 Pac. 998 (1911) (attempting to influence a judge); State v. Goff, 228 S.C. 17, 88
S.E.2d 788 (1955) (threats as to witnesses, jurors, or officers of the court); Young v.
State, 275 P.2d 358 (1954) (fighting in or near the courtroom).
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acts committed at a distance from the court in time or location tending
to hamper the administration of justice.1
The discussion herein shall be directed toward the status of trial
by jury in federal criminal contempt cases of a direct nature and those
indirect contempts in which Congress has not provided for trial by jury.
Exclusion of civil contempts and other indirect criminal contempts
is justified in that the former has been considered unquestionably set-
fled" and in the latter situation jury trials are granted by Rule 42 (b)
of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure.12 The denial of this right
in direct criminal contempts by the courts, however, has brought about
a multitude of challenges to the summary procedures employed.'"
TRADITIONAL TO CONTEMPORARY
Although the summary treatment of criminal contempt has been
"constitutionally" questioned and criticized, such contentions have been
consistently rejected. Precedent alone has accounted for the majority
of the Supreme Court denying the right to trial by jury until recently.
Confronted by the proposition once more, the Court stated that "sen-
tences exceeding six months for criminal contempt may not be imposed
by federal courts unless a jury trial has been received or waived." 14
Yet, the abrupt declaration is all too vague as to the constitutional
ground involved or the basis of such a sharp change of position. An
examination of the "trend of decision" clearly illustrates the shift and
10. Ex parte Earman, 85 Fla. 297, 95 So. 755 (1923); State v. Jones, 111 Or. 295, 226
Pac. 433 (1924); Bender v. Young, 252 S.W. 691 (1923).
11. Shillanti v. United States, 86 S.Ct. 1531 (1966). See Cheff v. Schnackenberg, 86
S.Ct. 1523, 1524 (1966) wherein the Court states:
Within the context of the question before us, however, the contention is ir-
relevant, for a jury trial is not required in civil contempt proceedings....
12. FED. R. CuM. P. 42 provides in pertinent part:
(a) A criminal contempt may be punished summarily if the judge certifies that
he saw or heard the conduct constituting the contempt and that it was corn-
mited in the actual presence of the court....
(b) A criminal contempt except as provided in subdivision (a) of this rule shall
be prosecuted on notice. The notice shall state the time and place of hearing
allowing a reasonable time for the preparation of a defense, and shall state the es-
sential facts constituting the criminal contempt charged and described it as
such.... The defendant is entitied to a trial by jury in any case in which an act
of Congress so provides....
13. See Gompers v. United States, 233 U.S. 604 (1914); Patterson v. Colorado, 205
U.S. 454 (1906); In re Debs, 158 U.S. 564 (1894); Eilenbecker v. District Ct., 134 U.S.
31 (1890).
14. Cheff v. Schnackenberg, supra note 11 at 1526.
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may be considered as a three stage process: 1) the traditional view;
2) the transitional approach; and 3) the contemporary rule.
Green v. United States,15 which does not present the issue clearly
from a factual standpoint, is probably the most direct affirmation of
the Court's long standing declarations as to the inapplicability of the
constitutional guarantee of trial by jury in contempt cases. The peti-
tioners, released on bond pending their appeal from their convictions
in Dennis v. United States,16 failed to surrender when ordered to do so.
When they reappeared after a four and a half year absence, the court
held them in contempt and summarily imposed a three-year sentence
in addition to the five-year sentence for violation of the Smith Act.'7
The defendants' claim, in requesting that the Supreme Court over-
turn the contempt conviction below, was not based upon a deprivation
of trial by jury, but that the proceedings had ignored the Fifth Amend-
ment18 guarantee of a grand jury indictment. They argued that since
a grand jury indictment was not returned, their crimes must be non-
infamous and thus their sentence should not exceed one year. In sup-
-port of this view, they asserted "that punishment for criminal contempts
cannot in any practical sense be distinguished from punishment for
substantive crimes .... " '9 Relying on its decisions holding that a jury
trial was not required for contempt cases,20 under either Article III
section two21 or the Sixth Amendment, 2 2 the Court concluded that the
15. 356 U.S. 165 (1958).
16. 341 U.S. 494 (1951). Cf. United States v. Thompson, 214 F.2d 545 (2d Cir. 1954);
United States v. Hall, 198 F.2d 726 (2d Cir. 1952).
17. 18 U.S.C. § 2385 (1952).
18. U.S. CONST. amend. V, which provides:
No person shall be held to answer for a capital or otherwise infamous crime,
unless on presentment or indictment of a Grand Jury ....
19. Green v. United States, supra note 15 at 184. Cf. Gompers v. United States,
233 U.S. 604 at 610 (1914).
20. The majority in Green referred to numerous cases for this proposition among
which were: Ex parte Savin, 131 U.S. 267 (1888); Eilenbecker v. District Ct, supra note
13; Interstate Commerce Commission v. Brimson, 154 U.S. 447 (1893); In re Debs, supra
note 13; Besett v. W. B. McConkey Co., 194 U.S. 324 (1903); United States v. United
Mine Workers, supra note 5; Michaelson v. United States, 266 U.S. 42 (1924).
21. U.S. CoNsr. art. III, § 2 cl. 3, provides:
The Trial of all Crimes, except in Cases of Impeachment, shall be by Jury....
22. U.S. CoNsT. amend. VI, which provides:
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and
public trial, by an impartial jury of the State and district wherein the crime shall
have been committed....
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Fifth Amendment indictment prerequisite was similarly unnecessary
in criminal contempt proceedings.3
By contrast, Barnett v. United States24 deals directly with the issue
of jury trial in contempt proceedings but provides less support for the
denial of the right than Green. Governor Barnett and Lieutenant
Governor Johnson charged with willfully disobeying certain restraining
orders of the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit demanded a jury
trial. The demand was based on two grounds, one statutory2 and the
other constitutional. The latter restated previous arguments to the
effect that criminal contempt by its very nature was within the safe-
guards of jury trial contained in Article III and the Sixth Amendment.
Rejection of the defendants' contentions likewise was largely repeti-
tious, consolidating the rationale of Barnett's predecessors.
Mr. Justice Clark delivering the majority opinion of the Court em-
phasized that the claim which was asserted had been raised time and
time again but rejected as systematically and often as raised.26  The
opinion went on to dismiss as unpersuasive the argument of historical
error 7 while expressing the Court's unwillingness to depart from "a
long and unbroken line of decisions. .." 28 Despite purporting ad-
23. Reliance on the rulings that jury trial requirements do not apply to contempt
cases not only demonstrated the Court's adherence to the view therein, but illustrated
their attitude toward the rule. It was such a positive maxim that it provided a basis
for decision.
24. 376 U.S. 681 (1963).
25. The defendant's contentions herein labeled statutory were based upon 1) 18 U.S.C.
401(3) which gives courts of the United States power to punish contempts consisting
of disobedience of their orders, and 2) 18 U.S.C. §§ 402, 3691 which provide when dis-
obedience also constitutes a separate criminal offense there may be trial by jury if the
case was not brought by the United States and is the order of a district court. (The
question as to whether it was the order of a district court arose since the district court
refused to issue the order when requested, but the court of appeals reversed and the
order was thereby granted.) The Court disposed of these claims denying the existence
of all essential elements.
26. See note 20 supra.
27. The argument that summary proceedings for contempt is the result of historical
error was developed extensively by Sir John Fox in his treatise, The History of Con-
tempt of Court (1922). The author attributes its origin to an undelivered opinion of
Justice Wilmot. The case, King v. Almon justified summary treatment as -being
founded upon "immemorial usage". The text continues, in explaining that the statement
was somewhat inexact as there was no common law precedent for this procedure until
1720. Thus the opponents of summary proceedings in contempt cases urge that by
applying the yardstick usually employed as to matters of procedure, looking backward
to the usage of England, the matter is not as well settled as the majority might feel.
Cf. Murray v. Hoboken Land and Improvement Co, 18 How. (U.S.) 272 at 280 (1855).
28. Green v. United States, supra note 15 at 183.
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herence to the traditional view outwardly, the majority opinion reveals
vagueness as to the future disposition of constitutional claims for jury
trials in criminal contempt cases.
The vagueness results from the crucial dictum of footnote 12, al-
though only a terse single sentence without discussion or amplification
in the opinion, it demonstrates a readiness of some members of the
majority to depart from the line of precedent.29 Standing alone, the
opinion discloses neither the number nor identifies the Justices who
support this interpretation or even the reasons upon which it is based. 0
Together with the four dissenting Justices whatever the portion of the
majority described by the statement it becomes perfectly clear that
the Court was prepared to "repudiate an interpretation of the Constitu-
tion that dates from the time when the Constitution was adopted and
has been accepted from the earliest days of the country." 31
Following the foreshadowing of a reversal expressed in Barnett, the
Court proceeded to effectuate its position in Cheff v. Schnackenberg.'
Unfortunately, the factual situation was less than desirable for pro-
pounding the new view. Cheff, along with the Holland Furnace Co.
and ten other officers, was charged with criminal contempt of the
Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit.33 The alleged contemnors
were tried by a three-judge panel, without a jury, which found that
the corporation and three of its officers, including Cheff, were guilty
of violating a previous order of the court. Sentence was set at six
months imprisonment for Cheff whereupon he petitioned for certiorari.
Limiting review to the question whether, after denial of a demand for
trial by jury, imprisonment for a period of six months is constitu-
tionally permissible under Article III and the Sixth Amendment, the
Court held that there was no right to a jury trial and affirmed the
judgment.
. In holding that Cheff was not entitled to a jury, the majority re-
ferred to the dictum of Barnett34 in characterizing the appellant's con-
29. "In view of the impending contempt hearing effective administration of justice
requires that this dictton be added: Some members of the Court are of the view that,
without regard to the seriousness of the offense, punishment by summary trial without
a jury would be constitutionally limited to that penalty provided for petty offenses."
376 U.S. at 695 n. 12.
30. Tefft, The United States v. Barnett: "Twas a Famous Victory", THE Supa amE
COURT REviEw 1964, at 134 (1964).
31. Ibid.
32. Supra note 14.
33. In re Holland Furnace Company et al., 341 F.2d 548 (1965).
34. The dictum mentioned was to the effect that some members of the Court were
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tention as stating "that the right to jury trial attaches in all criminal
contempts and not merely in those which are outside the category of
'petty offenses'." 35 It is in this regard that the facts of the case make
the change of position as to the requirement of jury trials in criminal
contempts ambigious. The decision itself merely denies the right as
to a sentence not exceeding a sentence of six months. 6 While the situ-
ation is not especially apt to depart from the multitude of cases deny-
ing jury trials to criminal contemnors, the Court manages to do so as
to federal courts by exercise of the supervisory power. Rather than
leaving the question as to cases involving a sentence in excess of six
months unanswered, the Court ruled "that sentences exceeding six
months for criminal contempts may not be imposed by federal courts
unless a jury trial has been received or waived." 37
By employing the supervisory power and failing to reveal the ra-
tionale for the application of the jury trial requirement to criminal
contempts, many questions remain unresolved. Absence of rationale
in support of the jury requirement limits the preciseness with which
the scope and effect of Cheff may be assessed. Yet, such an assessment
may be made with maximum accuracy by examining the judicial and
legislative attitudes towards summary procedures in contempt cases
and the very nature of the constitutional guarantees of trial by jury.
THE ABSENCE OF RATIONALE
Two significant considerations have justified the exercise of the judi-
cial power over contempt, being; 1) the efficient functioning of the
judicial system which is dependent upon the tribunal's ability to reg-
ulate proceedings in the courtroom in accordance with the practices
deemed most likely to effectuate a just result, and 2) to prevent the
reduction of the courts to the position of mere sounding boards by
permitting enforcement of judicial decrees and other orders.3 The
of the view that, without regard to the seriousness of the contemptuous behavior,
punishment by summary trial would be constitutionally limited to that provided for
petty offenses. See Callan v. Wilson, 127 U.S. 540 (1888) (holding petty offenses at
common law were properly tried in summary proceedings). Cf. District of Columbia
v. Clawans, 300 U.S. 617, 624 (1936).
35. Cheff v. Schnackenberg, 86 S. Ct. 1523 (1966).
36. See 18 U.S.C. § 1 which provides in pertinent part:
any misdemeanor, the penalty for which does not exceed imprisonment for a
period of six months ... is a petty offense.
37. Cheff v. Schnackenberg, supra note 35 at 1526.




designation of contempt proceedings as sui generis 9 simply reflects
the view that the procedures employed in contempt cases are indis-
pensable to the proper administration of an effective judicial system.40
Every judge who presides over a court may punish for contempt 4' and
when committed in open court it may be adjudged on the court's
knowledge of the facts. 42 Summary punishment may be imposed with-
out notice, affidavit, or hearing.43 Due process requires neither formal
complaint nor an opportunity to defend,44 nor is written notice a
requirement.4-1
In recent years, summary proceedings have been criticized as an
anomaly in a system of law which guarantees due process, 46 but ad-
vocates of the extra-ordinary procedures have defended them as being
necessary and essential. Such defenses though, have not wholly dis-
regarded the potential excesses and abuses inherent in an unlimited
contempt power. Realizing that criminal contempt is easily susceptible
to abuse, Mr. Justice Frankfurter cautioned:
[B]ut this power does not authorize the arbitrary imposition of
punishment. To dispense with an indictment by grand jury and a trial
by jury of twelve does not mean to disregard reason and fairness.
Reason and fairness demand, and even in punishing contempt, pro-
cedural safeguards within which the needs for effective administra-
tion of justice can be amply satisfied while at the same time the
result of so drastic a power is kept within limits that will minimize
abuse.4 7
39. Sui generis is defined generally as "of its own kind or class" indicating the devia-
tion from ordinary procedures to a form particularly adaptable to its specific purpose.
40. See Besette v. V. B. Conkey Co., 194 U.S. 324 (1904); State v. Barlow, 132 Neb.
166, 271 N.W. 282 (1937); Penfield Co. v. S.E.C., 330 U.S. 585 (1947) (dissenting opinion
of Frankfurter, J.). Cf. Lane, The Contempt Power v. The Concept of A Fair Trial,
supra note 38 at 358.
41. Sacher v. United States, 343 U.S. 1 (1952) (dictum).
42. Ex parte Terry, 128 U.S. 289 (1888) (dictum); Ex parte Morris, 252 Ala. 551, 42
So.2d 17 (1949).
43. Shotkin v. Atchinson, Topeka and Santa Fe R.R., 124 Colo. 141, 235 P.2d 990
(1951).
44. Rubin v. State, 192 Wis. 1, 211 N.W. 926 (1927).
45. Garland v. State, 99 Ga. 826, 110 S.E.2d 143 (1959); State ex rel. Rankin v. District
Court, 58 Mont. 276, 191 Pac. 722 (1920).
46. Green v. United States, 356 U.S. 165 (dissenting, Black, J.).
47. Sacher v. United States, supra note 41 at 12 (dissenting Frankfurter, J.). See Fisher
v. Pace, 336 U.S. 155, 167 (1949) (dissent) where Mr. Justice Murphy stated:
The contempt power is an extraordinary remedy, an exception to our tradition
of fair and complete hearings. Its use should be carefully restricted....
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This concept of self-restraint has been a recurrent and powerful theme
throughout the law of criminal contempt, permitting appellate courts
to evade limiting the broad discretionary powers of the trial courts in
exercising the contempt power.48
The majority of the Supreme Court while systematically rejecting
contentions that trial by jury is a constitutional right of the contemnor,
has recognized his plight and extended certain rights and safeguards
afforded in criminal cases. Other than where a court punishes sum-
marily for direct contempt, the defendant in criminal contempt pro-
ceedings is entitled to reasonable notice and an opportunity to be
heard;4 9 confrontation of witnesses and to be represented by counsel;50
and the presumption of innocence.5 Proof of the contemptuous be-
havior must be beyond a reasonable doubt;52 cruel and unusual punish-
ment may not be imposed;58 nor may the accused be subjected to
double jeopardy. 4 The process has been one of "selective adoption"
whereby the Supreme Court has balanced the need for the contempt
power against the defendant's rights to constitutional protections.5
These constitutional protections though are the ones accorded a criminal
defendant.
It is this analogy of criminal cases to criminal contempts which has
been stressed by Mr. Justice Black in his frequent and severe criticisms
of summary procedure for trying contempts56 Admitting that criminal
contempt is not a technical crime, the argument hinges on the fact that
the sanctions that may be imposed in both may be and often are iden-
48. United States v. Appel, 211 Fed. 495 (S.D.N.Y. 1913) (advocating exercise of the
power only when facts constituting contempt are clear without collateral inquiry); Nye
v. United States, 313 U.S. 33 (1941) (should avoid use in determinations of guilt);
In-re Michael, 326 U.S. 224 (1945) (avoid where facts doubtful).
49. Cooke v. United States, 267 U.S. 517, 537 (1925).
50. In re Oliver, 333 U.S. 257 (1947).
51. United States v. Fleishman, 339 U.S. 349, 363 (1950). Cf. Ex parte Hudgings,
249 U.S. 378 (1919); Gompers v. Buck Stove and Range, 221 U.S. 418 (1911).
52. Michaelson v. United States, 226 U.S. 42 (1915); Hotaling v. Superior Ct., 191
Cal. 501, 217 Pac. 73 (1923).
53. United States ex rel. Brown v. Lederer, 140 F.2d 136, 139 (7th Cir. 1944), cert.
denied 322 U.S. 734 (1944).
54. In re Bradley, 318 U.S. 50 (1943).
55. The balancing process has resulted in the adoption of all the Sixth Amendment
guarantees except trial by jury prior to Cbeff. See Cooke v. United States supra note
49 at 534; In re Savin, 131 U.S. 267 (1889); Ex parte Terry, supra note 42.
56. This position has been frequently taken by Justice Black in his dissenting opinions.
See Green v. United States, 356 U.S. 165 (1958) (Justice Black joined by Chief Justice
Warren and Justice Douglas in requesting trial by jury in all criminal contempt cases);
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ieal. The argument is further extended in Green where the criminal
offense and criminal contempt have been equated by the Justice, stating:
As it may now be punished criminal contempt is manifestly a crime
by every relevant test of reason or history. It was always a crime at
common law punishable as such in the regular course of the criminal
law. It possesses all the earmarks commonly attributed to a crime.
A mandate of Government has allegedly been violated for which
severe punishment, including long prison sentences may be exacted-
punishment aimed at chastising the violator for his disobedience. 7
Having reached this stage it becomes easy to require trial by jury under
the commands of Article III and the Sixth Amendment.
The position posed by this argument has been difficult to refute but
the holdings which have denied the existence of such a right have not
been based upon the assumption that contempts were not within the
phrase "all criminal prosecutions" but upon the necessity of immediately
suppressing offensive behavior.58 Thus, applicability of one of the Sixth
Amendment rights does not necessarily import the applicability of the
entire amendment. 9
Paralleling the continual struggle for the right to trial by jury
through judicial decision has been a growing discontent with summary
proceeding and changes in the contempt power itself. This is evidenced
by congressional action in providing for jury trials of alleged con-
tempts in three situations: (1) cases in which the contemptuous act
constitutes a crime under state or federal law;60 (2) cases of construc-
tive contempt arising out of labor disputes;61 and (3) cases under the
voting-rights provisions of the Civil Rights Act of 1957.62 But all
direct and the remaining indirect criminal contempts as well as all civil
contempts continue to be punished summarily."'
Sacher v. United States, supra note 41 (with Justice Douglas urging trial by jury and
other provisions of the Bill of Rights as a matter of right in criminal contempt cases).
Cf. Offutt v. United States, 348 U.S. 11, 18 (1954) (concurring opinion); Nilva v.
United States, 352 U.S. 385, 396 (1957) (dissent).
57. Green v. United States, supra note 56 at 201.
58. See Gompers v. Bucks Stove and Range Co., supra note 51; In re Oliver, supra
note 50; Cooke v. United States, supra note 49.
59. Gompers v. United States, 233 U.S. 604, 610 (1914); Levine v. United States, 362
U.S. 610, 616 (1959).
60. The Clayton Act §§ 21-24, 18 U.S.C. H1 402, 3691 (1958).
61. The Norris-LaGuardia Act § 11, 18 U.S.C. § 3692 (1958).
62. 71 Stat. 638, 42 U.S.C. § 1995 (Supp. V 1958).
63. Goldfarb, The Constitution and Contempt, 61 MIcH. L. Rav. 283, 287 (1962).
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The Civil Rights Act is significant as it was intended to regulate the
severity of punishment in summary proceedings for indirect contempts
arising under its provisions.64 It has been concern with this same factor,
the level of punishment, which has been instrumental in inducing the
Court to alter its position as to the role of jury trials in contempt cases.
Imposition of relatively severe penalties may not be a recent occur-
rence 65 but the incidence of serious punishments has fostered doubts as
to the operation of the courts under the traditional contempt pro-
cedures.66 As a result, severity of sentence has emerged as the basic
premise of the proponents of trial by jury in: 1) the majority's foot-
note in Barnett; 2) the dissent by Mr. Justice Goldberg in that case;
and 3) the rule in the Cheff case. The similarities do not end here,
but the most important feature is that the treatment urged in each is
the same; i.e., all but "petty contempts" should be tried by a jury.
For this reason and due to the absence of rationale in the other two
instances, Mr. Justice Goldberg's dissenting opinion in Barnett gives
insight into the Court's intent.' Starting with the premise that criminal
contempts were tried summarily at the time of the adoption of the
Constitution, the dissent attributes this treatment not to the peculiar
nature of the offense but to the fact that the penalties imposed were
minor. Courts at the time imposed such penalties by summary pro-
ceedings in a variety of petty offense cases, "including but not limited
to criminal contempts." 68 In calling for the application of trial by jury,
the opinion adopts Mr. Justice Black's contention that criminal con-
tempts are a species of criminal offenses, stating:
Thus limited [to fixed non-trivial punishments], criminal contempts
are not essentially different from other "crimes" or "criminal prose-
64. Civil Rights Act of 1957, supra note 71 providing:
That in the event that such a proceeding for criminal contempt be tried be-
fore a judge without a jury and the sentence of the court upon conviction is a
fine in excess of the sum of $300 or imprisonment in excess of forty-five days,
which shall conform as near as may be to practice in other criminal cases.
65. In re Savin, supra note 55 (1889) (one year sentence); Hill v. United States ex
rel. Weiner, 300 U.S. 105 (1936) (two year sentence).
66. Since 1957 the Supreme Court of the United States has dealt with cases involving
penalties in excess of one year as follows: Nilva v. United States, supra note 56 (a year
and a day); Yates v. United States, 355 U.S. 66 (1957) (one year); Green v. United
States, supra note 56 (three years); Brown v. United States, 359 U.S. 41 (1958) (15
months); Levine v. United States, supra note 59 (one year); Piemonte v. United States,
367 U.S. 556 (1960) (18 months).
67. 376 U.S. 728-772 (1964) (dissenting Goldberg, J.).
68. Id. at 740.
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cutions". In each case punishment is imposed for a past violation of
a mandate of a coordinate organ of government: criminal contempt
involves punishment for violation of an order of a court; "crime"
involves punishment for a violation of a statute enacted by a legisla-
ture. I can see no greater need for certain and prompt punishment
for the former than for the latter.69
The persuasiveness of this view as opposed to the position advanced
by Mr. justice Black, which met with minimal success, is due to the
theory underlying the conclusions. For the most part the conclusions
drawn by each are identical, but Black's claim of "historical error"
in no way contradicts the majority approach. Regardless of any error
resulting in the development of summary proceedings for the trial of
contempt cases, the majority heretofore asserted that these procedures
prevailed at the time of the adoption of the Constitution. Mr. Justice
Goldberg begins with this premise but attributes the use of summary
punishment to the nature of the penalties involved. Consequently, in
maintaining that the nature of contempt penalties has changed, the
argument expands the majority approach rather than criticizing its
origin.
OPERATIoNs AND EFFECT OF Cheff
The direct effect of the Cheff decision is immediately apparent; i.e.,
"serious" criminal contempts must be tried before a jury in federal
courts unless the right is waived. Yet, the anticipated consequences
of this procedural change and test for its application are not expressly
indicated. Obviously, though, the Court has implied that the limitation
should not unduly hamper the functioning of the courts. This is clearly
a departure from the earlier justifications of the use of summary punish-
ment, which stressed that the courts could not operate effectively ab-
sent the ability to vindicate their authority immediately.70 The position
was based upon a balancing process whereby the danger that would
result from the suppression of justice was considered far greater than
the potential danger of abuse by the judiciary. Seemingly, in light
of the increased penalties in criminal contempt cases, the latter is now
thought to exceed the former.
The criteria for trial by jury in criminal contempts is somewhat
more definitive, although again by implication. Under the Court's
69. Id. at 754-55.
70. Beale, Contempt of Court, Criminal and Civil, 21 H.Av. L. REv. 161, 172 (1908).
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ruling, "sentences exceeding six months may not be imposed unless a
jury trial has been received or waived." 71 Thus the court must antic-
ipate the punishment to be imposed and where the punishment war-
ranted is greater than that which may be imposed for a petty offense72
a jury must be impaneled. The test therefore is the severity of sen-
tence in the particular case. Although this criteria is an outward de-
parture from the usual method,73 it is especially adaptable to the
peculiar nature of contempt penalties. As the potential sanctions in
criminal contempt proceedings are virtually unlimited, with no pre-
scribed maximum or minimum sentences for the actionable behavior, it
is necessary for the court to establish the maximum penalty possible
and thereby the procedure to be employed. While the point was not
considered by the Court, the fine limitation as to the petty-serious
deliniation would also be a standard in determining the applicability of
summary procedures to the alleged contemptuous acts.
Exercise of the supervisory power in effectuating the contemnor's
right to trial by jury is both deceptive and indicative. Footnote 12 of
Barnett, which foreshadowed the change, stated that some members of
the majority felt that trial by jury in criminal contempt cases might
be constitutionally required. The challenges to the use of summary
procedures have been continually based upon constitutional grounds
as was Mr. Justice Goldberg's dissent in the Barnett case. In establish-
ing the rule of the Cbeff decision, the majority indicates that they have
found the rationale of Goldberg's opinion most persuasive and even
adopted the rule urged therein. Yet, they specifically deny the classi-
fication of contempt as a crime, asserting once more that the offense is
sui generis, thereby avoiding the constitutional basis of the Barnett
dissent.
The evasion of a constitutional basis is undoubtedly due to the
Court's desire to foreclose collateral effects of such a decision, at least
for the time being. As a constitutional requirement founded upon clas-
sification of contempt as a criminal offense, the accused's right to trial
by jury could be traced to the guarantee of such provided for in the
71. Cheff v. Schnackenberg, 86 S.Ct. 1523, 1526 (1966).
72. 18 U.S.C. § 1 (3) limits the punishment for a petty offense to a fine not exceeding
$500 and/or six months imprisonment.
73. The maximum possible punishment as opposed to the punishment actually im-
posed is the usual method of determining the seriousness of the offense. See District
of Columbia v. Clawans, 300 U.S. 617, 623 (1936).
74. After the trial court determines the seriousness of the particular contemptuous
acts, that is whether the punishment for such should be in excess of six months, the
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Sixth Amendment. Collateral issues arising from this type of decision
would have necessitated a re-evaluation of other rights extended to crim-
inal offenses but not in criminal contempt cases, as the guarantee of
grand jury indictment. 75 Further extension, in relation to a state's treat-
ment of criminal contempts, would assuredly be the next problem
confronting the Court.
Such a request, that is, that the right to trial by jury is so funda-
mental as to be incorporated in the due process clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment, would pose a far more perplexing problem than the one
under consideration. 78  Any discussion of the probable results of the
Cheff rule based upon constitutional requirements would be merely
conjectural and speculative. The use of the Supreme Court's super-
visory power has in effect provided the federal contempt defendant
with the identical right to trial by jury in criminal contempt cases as
a criminal defendant would constitutionally have in the same courts.
7
T
The method by which the end has been achieved has limited the scope
of the right for the present merely to the federal courts. Rights of the
state criminal contempt defendant then rest with the state legislatures.
Robert P. Wolf
situation is tantamount to determining if the maximum prescribed penalty exceeds six
months. From this stage forward the proceedings would be identical.
75. See Green v. United States, supra note 56 (denial of right to be indicted by a
grand jury based upon absence of a constitutional right to trial by jury in contempt
cases).
76. Supreme Court decisions upholding the claim that due process does not require
trial by jury as at common law where concerned with changes in the system rather
than its denial. See Maxwell v. Dow, 176 U.S. 581 (1900) (jury of eight instead of
twelve permissible); Rawlins v. Georgia, 201 U.S. 638 (1906) (jury need not be drawn
from all the citizens of the district). Dictmn may also be found stating that a state might
abolish the procedure of jury trials altogether and still not violate the Fourteenth
Amendment. Maxwell v. Dow, supra at 603. Cf. Mott, Due Process of Law 213 (1926);
State v. Woodfin, 27 N.C. 199 (1844); State v. Shepard, 177 Mo. 205, 76 S.W. 79 (1903).
77. See Frankfurter and Corcoran, Petty Federal Offenses and the Constitutional
Guaranty of Trial by Jury, 39 HARv. L. REv. 917 (1926).
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APPENDIX
STATE COURTS: CRIMINAL CONTEMPTS AND TRIAL BY JURY
As indicated, any departure from the common law procedure of
treating all criminal contempts summarily must be by legislation. Most
states have statutory provisions in this regard while those state legisla-
tures that have ignored the problem, thereby retain, by implication,
the common law system. Comparison of these statutes reveals a myriad
of differences. Most distinguish between direct and indirect contempts,
providing for summary procedures for the former and notice, hearing
and time to prepare a defense for the latter. Many statutes limit con-
tempt penalties while others enumerate the acts which will constitute
contemptuous behavior so as to restrict the power.
An examination of the state statutes, discussing their provisions,
could hardly be more effective than the following survey which relates
the procedures to be applied in direct and indirect cases and the maxi-
mum punishments which may be imposed. In such a manner it be-
comes obvious which states afford the contemnor protections at least
equivalent to the present jury trial requirements in the federal courts.
This may result from: 1) statutes permitting the contemnor a jury
trial at his request; 2) maximum punishment by fines not exceeding
five hundred dollars and imprisonment of no more than six months or
both; and 3) the right to trial by jury attaching when a punishment
is imposed in excess of that provided in 2 above. An analysis of these
statutes reveals two states in the first category, twenty-six in the sec-
ond, and three in the third, leaving nineteen states in which the con-
temnor's plight is unmitigated.
[Vol. 8:76
9104)0 0 0 I









0 0 0Q ) 'o-d 0
M~~~~ ." E cQOfj12
4) ()~ a) cq > 0
01 0 0 D00
Q) 4U n
0j (2 P4 ;
0o ca'- C) )
0E4~0) a) ;.-
4Z ~ ~ U (3 c
















































































































































































































































-4 o 0 _


































































0 u5 ro a
'0 (1) 0 00 -o
0 0 0 -DA
rn; 0 m0 S
z U 0 e02 l 0i oa)c
0 0 14 -
S 00 0 -42
z X0 >4 l 0~
COD CO 4- ;
02 0 0CO 2




q 0 0 00
b4D
z) U) ; ,
P. , 0 r90 z 9
0 Sl
02 ~ 0  -D 00 Q 0
00
04 0
co ZsS O 0
I. p 1
Z Co, Co 1) )6: 0Cq eq ca R q ,e=rm4q 1
00
F4 ca 0 0C
4z )
o-d.r 0 0 ( 00c
C-- .f "
r4 00 --4
0 ~ 0 0 0 .-.
to 1- o C
0 ' M 12) P• 0 
0 0 C
4. C.) 1 0 0Z
al4 . U.) c 5
4n 5 d ca o.
H~4 *44. o
0 rx.  0
.4.-) . - .4 -
.
.I
ri)Ir 4-Z~40 ~ ~ 0 cd
Sho
00 0 0 r-
z z Z Z.5




c0 r.64.~ 0 0 0
002
E02 0)'-- O 
2
0w 0--
00 0 .C I'-,+ 0
m~ "d004
;D N . I=10
10 020 C 02 V f
4C0 C)O'Dc
C'0 Z2 00
ca- r. a) 00 00,~
-N Od 1 0 0 0=
0 OD M -4 C> C)
01 ;m O02 xI1 -0
Ej z C.) C * C) 02 U2 ca C
M 0
o ~ ~ 4 0.Z~Q 1












ZE ~ 02 a)w 0 0 caC
'- Co.
E'~ ~ j .g 144- 0 m ~ 04(
0 ca * +1-~.~7~o
C) 12 C.0 >o0
'o~ 0 0 ZO ca()04 0 r
o ZZca
0 40
to 0 d Cd o P 0.
cSO CD'~ C00
q CD 0 '-*= 001
.2 C. f 0l
"o2 0 0 t
-- 0- P4 4 0
;. 0 d 4 C
.F ~02 024 d41 --0=4 p 0
",,o o -
CoO a). 02 0.O
-1 0 0o~f
0 0 d 0
clo, 4-
0 0 0 0 019.4 rz 0 0 .0)





























































Q 4z 0o 00
r4 C
0 o
U2
.
d
Q3
0.-
02
a)
0
Cd
0
a)
0
4
;)
U2
0
0.
CDa)
-0
04
caS
o
-41
0C
oU
0 12
0 ;.
Ca
&.
U2 0
P C3
0
ho
o U2
C>?)7-
00U'
0
7)
0
a)
ca
-0
0 co
go
U2
-~0
0 P
0 i
(2)
